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The
there was another action pending at the same time.
second action was instituted in federal court twenty-five days after
the instant case was commenced. The court held that in order to
obtain such a dismissal, the other action must have been commenced
prior to the action in which the motion is made. Although this
seems to be the first such holding under CPLR 3211(a) (4), it
merely restates the rule which prevailed under the CPA.: 2
CPLR 3213.: Defects in moving papers.
Under CPLR 3213, a plaintiff suing on a "judgment or
instrument for the payment of money only" may serve a notice of
motion for summary judgment and supporting papers with the
summons in lieu of a complaint. This procedure provides a means
of securing a speedy judgment on claims which are "presumptively
meritorious. 11 3 The ordinary requirement of a formal complaint
and answer are deemed superfluous and needlessly time consuming.
If the motion is denied, the motion papers are treated as the pleadings unless the court orders otherwise."x4
In Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Wisrter,"15 the appellate term,
first department, reversed, with leave to renew, a motion granting
plaintiff summary judgment because of defects in the moving papers
and summons. Aside from amendable irregularities in the summons, one defect noted by the court was the absence of an authenticating certificate required by CPLR 2309(c) from plaintiff's
supporting affidavit. Thus, because of plaintiff's failure to have
the "flag"
attached to its affidavit, it was not properly before the
8
court." 6
Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to allege its corporate status
pursuant to the requirements of CPLR 3015(b). It would appear,
however, that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to have amended
this defect. While upon motion the supporting papers must contain
all of the essentials of a complaint, the omission of the allegation
of corporate status in a formal complaint, if non-prejudicial, is
usually ignored. 1 7 Thus, the court might have ignored the defect
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or deemed it amended if the sole error*had been the failure to
allege corporate status.
The practitioner should note that, although the court reversed
the order granting the motion, it did so with leave to renew the
motion on proper papers. It appears that the court was motivated
by the cumulative effect of the errors rather than by their individual
importance.
CollateralEstoppel: Unavailable to party where issue in subsequent
suit was similar but not identical to that previously determined.
While res judicata serves to prevent the relitigation of a particular cause of action where there has been a final judgment on
the merits, collateral estoppel insures that issues previously litigated
and determined will be conclusive in a subsequent suit involving
different causes of action or parties."18 Both are doctrines of repose
and, although closely related, are technically distinct. For example,
if A sues B for negligence and recovers, the doctrine of res judicata
will bar any subsequent suit by A against B on the same cause of
action. However, if, in the subsequent suit, A sues B on a
different cause of action, but one in which an issue is identical
with one in the previous suit, res judicata would not apply. Here,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be used -to preclude a
ielitigation of the issue.
Previously, the courts generally imposed a requirement of
mutuality upon one seeking to interpose the doctrine of collateral
§toppel. "It is a principle of general elementary law that the
estoppel of a judgment must be mutual." "'9 This connotes that
ihe party seeking to invoke the estoppel must have been either a
party or privy to the suit in which the judgment was rendered. 2 0
Subject to several exceptions, 21 the rule of mutuality was adhered
to by22 the New York courts until the case of Israel v. Wood Dolson
Co.'

was decided in 1956.

In Israel, the Court of Appeals allowed a defendant who had
not been a party to the prior action to assert the previous determination of an issue in a subsequent suit. Rather than merely
establishing a new exception to the rule of mutuality the Court
stated that:
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